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THE VOLATILITY OF VOLATILITY:  
Measuring Change in Party Vote Shares 
For Electoral Studies 
Abstract  
Volatility is a widely used term in political science, but even the most widely used measure of 
volatility, Pedersen’s index, can mask as much as it reveals.  His simple and elegant calculation has 
become part of the political science toolbox, but scholars employing this tool have tended to 
produce distinctly different results thanks to a series of decisions about measurement and 
classification. Using examples from Central Europe the critical role of decisions related to party 
continuity and threshold of inclusion are identified. The article not only unpacks the underlying 
questions addressed by different uses of Pedersen’s index, but offers standards for choosing 
particular methods over others and outlines steps that should be followed in creating a more 
accurate measure of volatility. 
 
1. Introduction  
The political world - and particularly the world of political parties - appears to be in the middle of a 
period of intense, perhaps unprecedented change, but we cannot be sure unless we can have 
confidence that our measurements capture the type and degree of change. Few indicators in political 
science are more widespread than Mogens Pedersen’s (1979) Index of Electoral Volatility. His 
straightforward calculation became part of the political science toolbox four decades ago and has 
remained constantly in use.1 Nevertheless, scholars employing this tool have tended to produce 
distinctly different results thanks to a series of decisions about measurement and classification. 
                                               
1 Pedersen’s 1979 article had 890 citations in Google scholar as of 1 August 2017. 
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Cooks following the same recipe should produce similar cakes, but only if that recipe specifies all 
of the important choices. Slightly different ingredients mixed in different ways can yield cakes 
which look and taste markedly different. Differences in volatility scores, however, are not just a 
matter of taste.  Measurements of volatility matter not just because they form the springboards for 
theoretical discussions of the causes of continuity and change in party systems and politics more 
broadly, but because these measurements are used as proxies in research on dozens of other political 
and economic questions and are used not just as dependent but also independent variables.  
 
Tools for measurement in political science tend to have their limitations and can be accused of bias. 
In the relatively stable party systems of Western Europe in the twentieth century where there were 
only occasional new entrants, the limitations of Pedersen’s method appeared unimportant, but when 
applied to the more fluid electoral environments of third wave democracies (or today’s fluid 
Western Europe), those limitations have become clearer. Aware of some of the limitations of 
Pedersen’s calculation, Birch (2003), Mainwaring and colleagues (2016) and Powell and Tucker 
(2014) produced newer and more complex measures of volatility, which help to specify how much 
volatility resulted from party entry and exit. These significant advances do not, however, address 
other factors affecting volatility scores, such as thresholds for including data and different ways of 
dealing with the changing morphology of party competition such as the decision by Bartolini and 
Mair (1990) to link together parties with a common origin.  
 
What these approaches have in common is that they all build on the foundations laid down by 
Pedersen in the 1970s. Indeed, Pedersen’s index remains the starting point for most attempts to 
capture electoral volatility and party system change. Any attempt to forge a better and more 
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accurate measure, therefore, must begin from analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Pedersen’s formula and its application.2  
 
After outlining why measures of volatility matter, drawing on cases from Central Europe - a region 
notable for both high and varied levels of volatility - this article shows how application of 
Pedersen’s index produces strikingly different scores due to a wide variety of subtle but significant 
differences in method that authors introduce when applying the index. In particular, we identify the 
critical role of decisions related to party continuity and the threshold of inclusion. Moreover, we 
offer standards for choosing particular applications over others and whilst recognizing the merits of 
Pedersen’s tool we conclude by suggesting elements that need to be incorporated into a useable 
successor to Pedersen that would be able to capture the type and extent of change in party vote 
shares.  
 
2. Why volatility matters 
There is a lot at stake in our measurement of volatility.  Scholars agree that volatility in political 
party systems matters for democracy, and they use calculations of party vote shares as an indicator 
of a wide variety of phenomena and as an independent variable in studies about the health of 
democracy.  
 
Scholars are nearly unanimous in seeing a strong link between changes in the party political 
landscape and the process of democratization, and they argue that a stable party system is a key 
                                               
2 It is worth noting that Pedersen was not the first to seek to measure volatility in this way. See Delruelle et al. (1970), 
Fraeys (1977) and Przeworski (1975). 
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element in overall democratic stabilization (e.g. Tavits, 2005) because they ‘foster more effective 
programmatic representation and reduce uncertainty’ (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007, 157). In their 
respective landmark studies of new democracies in Southern Europe and Latin America both 
Morlino (1998) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) maintain that party system stability is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the consolidation of democracy, and many subsequent 
studies link high and persistent levels of volatility with democratic weakness.  Volatility measures 
matter not only for studies of the survival of new democracies but also for research examining the 
health and development of long-standing democracies which have witnessed the growth of new, 
anti-establishment parties and experienced “earthquake” elections.  
 
High standards for measuring volatility are particularly important because the Pedersen index is 
used not only as an indicator of changes in party vote share—the phenomenon that it directly 
measures—but also as a proxy for many other developments including voter movement (Epperly, 
2011; Dassonville and Hooghe, 2015), government alternation (Mair, 2007), party system 
institutionalization (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014; Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2015), elite change 
(Ishiyama, 2013), declining partisanship (Lupu and Stokes, 2010) and regime stability (Bielasiak, 
2001). Volatility may not necessarily suffice as a valid stand-in for all of these phenomena 
mentioned above, but as long as scholars use it for a wide range of applications across a broad 
temporal and geographical canvas, it is essential to ‘pin down numbers’ and make the measure as 
reliable as possible (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). 
 
3. Why volatility is so volatile 
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The elegance and simplicity of Pedersen’s index of volatility has allowed it to emerge as the 
dominant measure of change in party systems, but those same qualities have not prevented scholars 
from disagreeing sharply about volatility scores for specific countries during specific periods. The 
index goes to the heart of the question of political change by looking at changes in party vote share 
over time. In its simplest form, it calculates the total amount of change experienced by all individual 
entities in a closed system.  For each entity it calculates the net change of a particular characteristic 
between two time periods, then takes the absolute value of this change (to prevent positives and 
negatives from cancelling out), and divides the result by the total amount of the characteristic in the 
system at the first and second time periods.  Phrased in terms of specific variables, it calculates the 
absolute value of the net change of a particular characteristic (P), for every entity (i) between two 
time periods (t and t+1) divided by the sum of the same characteristic (P) at both time periods (t and 
t+1) 
𝑉 =
∑ |P𝑖,𝑡+1 − P𝑖,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
(∑ P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
As used by Pedersen, it is the sum of the net change of party vote shares (before to after) divided by 
the sum of all party votes (before and after).3 Since most calculations of this nature employ the vote 
share of the full party system, the sum of all values of P is equivalent to 1 at both t and t+1.  The 
formula can therefore be simplified to 
𝑉 =
∑ |P𝑖,𝑡+1 − P𝑖,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
2
 
which can be rephrased simply as: 
𝑉 =
∑ |ΔP𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
2
 
                                               
3 Pedersen 1979, 4. 
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The parsimony of the formula does not, however, translate immediately into harmony among those 
scholars who apply it to complex party systems.  Studies of volatility involving Central Europe4 
offer a useful starting point because concern about the region’s democratic development has led 
many scholars to calculate its volatility scores.  The rapid changes in the vote shares of parties in 
Central Europe are unusual by traditional Western Europe standards (Lane and Ersson, 2007; 
Lewis, 2006; Millard, 2004; Tavits 2005, 2008), but they are not notably different from those of 
Latin America, Africa and Asia and or indeed from recent electoral periods in Western European 
countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain.   
 
3.1 Detailing disagreements among volatility calculations 
The many calculations of Pedersen volatility index scores in Central Europe often tend to agree in 
finding high average levels of volatility in the region, but a comprehensive examination of the 
results shows that they disagree sharply on the scores of particular countries in particular electoral 
periods.  Table 1 displays the starkly different results of thirteen major studies generating Pedersen 
volatility index scores for Central European countries for electoral periods between 1990 and 2015.5 
In almost every country these scores exhibit wide differences that are not attributable to a small 
number of outliers.  The coefficient of variation among all among authors for particular countries in 
particular periods averaged 0.31 for all countries and election periods, but for individual countries’ 
election periods it ranged from a low of 0.11 to a high of 0.61.  Out of 1,103 possible pairwise 
comparisons, the authors reached identical scores in fewer than one percent of the cases (9 cases, 
0.8 per cent) and came within one point in fewer than twelve percent of all cases (128, 11.6 per 
                                               
4 Defined for the purpose of this paper as the 10 states from the region which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007: Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
5 Tavits’ 2005 seminal study on the sources of party system stability in Eastern Europe draws its figures for volatility 
directly from Birch (2003). 
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cent). Pairwise gaps of more than 10 points (452 cases, 41.0 per cent) were actually more numerous 
than gaps of fewer than 5 points (423 cases, 38.4 per cent). The largest gaps between volatility 
assessments for any single country were 54.8 points for Estonia’s first electoral period and 54.7 for 
Poland’s second electoral period, but all ten countries had at least one gap of more than 15 points 
and eight of the ten countries had at least one gap of more than 30 points.  It is striking that even 
scholars with strong knowledge of party politics in their native country differ by significant 
margins. The gap between Gwiazda and Markowski in Poland, for example, averages 4.8 points and 
is never closer than 3.0 points in any of the five election periods in which they both calculate 
volatility.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
At first glance the contrasting calculations generated by different scholars focusing on Central 
Europe might be seen to be of limited interest to the wider field of comparative politics. 
Nonetheless, not only is the generation of distinctly different scores by different scholars not unique 
to that region of Europe as calculations of volatility using Pedersen for Africa (Lindberg, 2007; 
Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001), Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Roberts and Wibbels, 
1999) and Southern Europe (Gunther 2007; Gallagher et al, 2011) show, but also those calculations 
for Central Europe have been widely used not just to describe, but also explain both region-wide 
phenomena and intra-regional differences. Take, for example, O’Dwyer’s and Kovalčík (2007) 
account of why only some countries embarked on second-generation economic reforms. Using 
volatility statistics as a proxy for institutionalization, they argue that a labile party system may 
actually insulate state reformers from social and political pressures, thereby allowing politicians to 
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undertake more radical packages of economic reform. For Estonia in the mid-1990s and Slovakia in 
the early 2000s their volatility scores for those two countries were higher than in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic where the more radical packages were not introduced. Whilst we are broadly 
persuaded by their argument if their numbers were replaced by those of other scholars in table 1 
such as Bågenholm or Dassonneville and Hooghe, then their argument becomes far less compelling.  
 
Different measures, however, do not just have impact on the explanatory power of volatility, but 
also on the causes and mechanisms associated with volatility. Bernhard and Karakoc’s (2011) 
assessment of the links between volatility and inequality, Andrews and Bairett’s (2014) explanation 
of the causes of volatility and even one of author of this article’s analysis of party system 
institutionalization (Author) would alter significantly if based on volatility statistics chosen from 
another author in Table 1. This article does not seek to say which statistics (and therefore which 
conclusions) are right and which are wrong, but rather to highlight how different calculations affect 
the consequences, causes and mechanisms of volatility.  
 
Were it simply a question of each author in table 1 having identical patterns but a different baseline 
or a different scale, it might be easy to harmonize them, but for many countries the relative 
positions differ sharply in direction and scale and with little consistency over time.  Although the 
coefficient of variation among authors did not increase markedly in any country over time, it also 
did not show any overall tendency to decline.  For many countries there was no consistency at all: 
Hungary’s first election period, for example, appears near the bottom of Mainwaring’s and Toka’s 
ranks but near the top of Dassonneville and Hooghe’s, whereas Poland’s second election period is 
near the bottom of Bågenholm’s but near the top of Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni’s and 
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Powell and Tucker’s. Other countries produced more consistent evaluations but the consistency 
lasted only for a few election periods: Bulgaria is near the bottom of every author’s scale of 
volatility for the first election period while the Czech Republic is at the bottom of nearly every scale 
for the second and third periods and Latvia and Lithuania are almost universally at the top of 
authors’ scales for the first three electoral periods.  Among author pairs with more than 20 country-
electoral period observations in common, correlations range from a high of r=0.90 (Sikk compared 
to Lane and Ersson, n=20) to a low of r=0.46 (Sikk compared to Powell and Tucker, n=20). Overall, 
the average correlation among the pairs with more than 20 observations in common was r=0.73, 
which is fairly robust for a correlation among different phenomena but shockingly low for results 
that are intended to measure the same phenomenon.  
 
Since all of these authors are working with more or less the same electoral data, the reason for the 
differences must lie elsewhere.  A closer examination shows that there are significant differences in 
the methods that authors use to incorporate the election data into the Pedersen index calculations.  
The differences emerge because those who would calculate volatility index scores must wrestle with 
the interrelated problems of small parties and party continuity.  For many authors, especially those 
engaged in large-scale comparative enterprises, identifying the twists and turns of small parties 
becomes an overwhelming burden.  Identifying continuity is difficult enough with large parties, 
especially where these face party splits and engage in mergers and name changes.  Pedersen’s index 
actually provides several different options for dealing with these problems, but not all authors use 
the options in the same way, and the various combinations allow Pedersen’s seemingly 
uncomplicated formula to produce a remarkably complex array of results.  The three main options 
for adapting Pedersen’s formula to deal with size and continuity are rooted directly in the rules for 
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linking party data across time, for aggregating party data into a single number, and for recalculating 
individual data points. 
 
3.2 Linkage and aggregation of entities: What counts as a connection? 
Perhaps the most complicated aspect of volatility calculations is linking party values over time in 
the face of party name changes, mergers, splits and various combinations thereof. The category of 
‘genuinely new’ parties (Sikk, 2005) is smaller than it might at first look, and a large number of the 
entrants in any given electoral period involve partial continuity. Many scholars of volatility respond 
with case-by-case judgments or with rule-based formulae for deciding which party Pi,t to link with 
which party Pi,t+i. Methods that use a stricter interpretation of continuity between t and t+1 err on 
the side of discontinuity and tend to code name changes, splits and mergers and new parties that 
represent sources of volatility.  Methods emphasizing continuity may opt instead for a more relaxed 
understanding of linkage and pair a party at time t with whatever party it is most closely related—
either by name, organizational structure or vote total—at time t+1.  Even in these relatively 
regularized, rule-based systems, however, there may still be considerable human judgment in the 
assessment of which parties are to be considered within the set of plausible successors.  Such 
decisions become even more sensitive when applying Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni (2016) 
and Powell and Tucker’s (2014) intra- versus extra-system distinction that depends heavily on 
whether parties are considered as successors or as new. 
 
For those scholars who are reluctant to declare a single predecessor in a merger or a single 
successor in a split, the Pedersen formula includes a second implicit option: the possibility of 
aggregating the values of two or more parties at either t or t+1 or both before linking them.  For 
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example, if Party A merges with Party B to form Party C, the aggregation method sums Party A and 
B into a single data point at time t and compares it with party C at time t+1.  If, at the same time, 
party D splits off from party A, the method would compare the sum of Party A and B with the sum 
of Party C and D.  This approach eliminates the need for choice among potential links and 
emphasizes the continuity that may exist between the original party and multiple successors (or 
predecessors).  Of course in the process it diminishes the number of entities (i) and therefore makes 
the indicator itself less sensitive. Another common application of this method involves the 
aggregation of small parties at a particular time period into a single data point commonly referred to 
as “Other.”  Which parties are thus aggregated usually depends on rules for including parties in the 
main calculation. 
 
3.3 Inclusion and exclusion of information: Which data points count? 
Limits of time and information mean that it may not be practical (or even possible) to gather data 
for small parties.  Even though new data storehouses and national websites provide extensive 
electoral results for most countries, questions of linkage over time are still extremely difficult and 
time-consuming for very small parties, especially since such parties often face splits by disgruntled 
members and seek to improve their fortunes through name changes and mergers.  Although some 
authors make ad hoc exclusions based on the availability of data, most seek to avoid selection bias 
problems by imposing a numerical criterion for inclusion usually based on the magnitude of a 
party’s election result.  Even with a clear threshold, additional questions remain, particularly 
whether to apply the threshold in a blanket fashion and include values for a particular party if it 
exceeds the threshold at any point in time, or to include only individual data points that exceed the 
threshold.  The former option does little to solve the data collection problem since researchers may 
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still need to find obscure data for parties that only later crossed the threshold; the latter option, by 
contrast, severs the continuity of party results by relegating some data points—those below the 
threshold—to the “other” category or dismissing them completely.  An intermediate strategy 
involves the use of transitional pairs of data points to capture each period in which a party’s support 
crosses the threshold, but does not calculate data points that are not adjacent in time to periods 
above the threshold.  Table 2 offers a hypothetical example of how each of these strategies could be 
applied and how the application would affect volatility scores: 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Using transitional pairs thus involves some recalculation of data points (and the possible transfer of 
those values to the “Other” category), but not as much as using only individual points.  The blanket 
inclusion method, by contrast, either includes all values or omits a party entirely. 
 
Questions of inclusion are also at the heart of recent modifications to Pedersen’s index which seek 
to distinguish changes in established parties from changes introduced by the entrance and exit of 
parties from the party system.  In an instance of parallel invention, two groups of scholars -
Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni (2016) and Powell and Tucker (2014) - simultaneously devised 
a formula for disaggregating Pedersen that builds on earlier work by Birch (2003). 
 
             Within-system/Type B    Extra-system/Type A 
 
𝑉 =
∑ |P𝑖𝑐,𝑡+1−P𝑖𝑐,𝑡|+∑ (P𝑖𝑛,𝑡+1+P𝑖𝑥,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
(∑ P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= (
∑ |P𝑖𝑐,𝑡+1−P𝑖𝑐,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
∑ (P𝑖𝑛,𝑡+1+P𝑖𝑥,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
(∑ P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
)  
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where ic refers to continuous parties with nonzero values in both t and t+1, in refers to new parties 
with zero values at t but nonzero values at t+1, and ix refers to parties that exited the political scene 
yielding non-zero values at t and zero values at t+1.  Since in by definition has no predecessors and 
ix has no successors, these can stand alone in the calculation, implicitly subtracting the previous 
support or successive support (equal to zero).  By then looking only at the left or right hand of the 
equation, these authors can calculate the total contribution to volatility represented by continuous 
parties and by those entering or leaving the system and provide distinct figures for within-system 
and extra-system volatility. The scores generated for within-system volatility can also be added to 
the extra-system scores to produce an overall volatility score that is equivalent to Pedersen’s 
formula. 
 
Mainwaring et al and Powell and Tucker’s disaggregation of ‘intra’ and ‘extra’ system volatility is a 
major advance in our understanding and has generated much fruitful discussion (Crabtree and 
Golder, 2016a, 2016b; Powell and Tucker, 2016). But it is striking is that the foundation stone on 
which Mainwaring et al and Powell and Tucker’s disaggregation is based is the Pedersen index.  
Because their newer and more sensitive instruments are correspondingly more vulnerable to 
distortion (Crabtree and Golder 2016a, 2016b) caused by small differences in measurement, it is 
even more important to understand the specific choices required by Pedersen’s index and how those 
choices might best (or at least most transparently) be made.  
 
3.5 Classifying authors’ choices of method 
Among the fourteen author methods cited here, there are eleven different choices and significant 
variation in each category: ten without specific thresholds and four with thresholds (ranging from 1 
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per cent to about 5 per cent) of which one uses recalculation and three use pairwise exclusion; seven 
of the ten including an “other” categories in their calculations; and seven assessing continuity on the 
basis of aggregation while four use the linkage method (two using strict linkage and two using 
relaxed linkage), and three use a mix or other variation.6   
 
 [following Reviewer 3’s suggestion we have moved what was table 3 to an appendix] 
 
4. How method choices affect volatility index scores 
How significant a role do these different choices play in producing the different volatility results?   
Not all authors look at all countries in all electoral periods and so an overall comparison of 
differences is impossible, but it is possible to calculate pair-wise differences between each author-
country pair and then average these to assess the relative magnitude of each author’s volatility 
assessments.  Comparing these results to choices about threshold shows no clear pattern.  A slightly 
stronger pattern emerges with regard to the “other” category, with higher volatility scores 
concentrated among those who do not include “other” in their calculations.  Finally, there appears to 
be a strong pattern related to the choice of aggregation or linkage in establishing continuity.  As 
Figure 1 indicates, with the exception of Birch (who in addition to these choices does not include 
new parties), the authors choosing the aggregation method have the lowest volatility scores, while 
those choosing the linkage methods are higher.  It is also noteworthy that the authors using the 
linkage methods also have a far greater range of scores than those using aggregation, which is to be 
expected since the results of the linkage methods are more affected by differences in binary choices 
of predecessor and successor that might differ from author to author even in the best of 
circumstances. 
                                               
6 See Table A in the appendix 
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[Figure 1 around here] 
 
With enough countries and enough combinations of methods, it should theoretically be possible to 
separate out the effect of particular choices on volatility scores, but at present there are far more 
variable combinations than there are authors using those combinations.  Figuring out the actual 
impact of each of these variables therefore requires a far more tightly focused method. Central 
European cases can provide the raw material for a closer analysis that lets us control for specific 
differences in inclusion, aggregation and linkage by applying every possible combination of those 
methods to the same sets of full electoral data.  The time- and knowledge-intensiveness of this 
process is quite substantial (and helps to explain the use of selective inclusion methods).  For many 
countries the demands of the process are prohibitive, but for three countries - the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia - we were able to assemble accounts of even the smallest parties (some with 
fewer than 1,000 votes) and to determine linkage patterns among these parties across each time 
period.  These three cases are also particularly useful because they exhibit a range of volatility 
characteristics: by nearly all estimates Slovakia experienced relatively high volatility throughout its 
first 20 years of democracy whereas Hungary’s volatility was relatively low in contrast to other 
Central European cases; the Czech Republic’s volatility was also low until the late 2000s but 
jumped sharply with the 2010 and 2013 elections. These differences both in level and consistency -
one low, one high, one low then high - provide a solid initial basis for testing the various 
permutations of method. 
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To operationalize every one of the theorized variants of the Pedersen index on these three cases, we 
performed a full set of calculations for each permutation of methods related to continuity and those 
related to threshold and inclusion.  
Continuity: we calculated volatility in each country according to three methods that affected 
linkage.   
1) Linkage method. There is a wide range of options to deal with the successors and 
predecessors in the case of splits, mergers and party name changes.  We calculated two 
distinct subsets of linkage according to different guidelines: 
a. Strict linkage: we calculated any split or merger involving a name change or other 
significant alteration from t to t+1 as a new party with no formal linkage to 
predecessors or successors. 
b. Relaxed linkage: we linked parties that merely changed names and in the case of 
split or merger we linked parties to the largest successor or predecessor while 
treating any other offspring or parents as unlinked across time periods. 
2) Inclusive aggregation method. In the case of a party split or merger we aggregated all 
predecessor and successor parties treating them as a single party in each time period.   
Threshold: We calculated Pedersen scores first with no threshold and then with thresholds at ten 0.5 
per cent additional increments up to 5.0 per cent (the highest level used by any author in the sample 
above). 
Inclusion: We calculated scores using three threshold-based inclusion methods in three ways, two of 
which are used by authors in the sample and a third potential option: 
1) Individual points: This method includes only data points that stand above the threshold and 
recalculates others as zero. 
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2) Transitional pairs: This method includes all at points that stand above the threshold and data 
points from the periods immediately before and after the point above the threshold.   
3) Blanket inclusion: Including all parties whose maximum vote share rose above the threshold 
at any time period again.  
Inclusion of the “Other”: For parties that were excluded from the calculations above, we performed 
volatility calculations with and without an aggregated “other” category.   
1) Aggregated and linked other. We produced an aggregated “other” for each election 
consisting of the sum of data points not included elsewhere, and treated this as a distinct 
unit, whose changes over time contribute to volatility calculations like those of any other 
party.   
2) Uncalculated.  Data points not included elsewhere were not included in volatility 
calculations. 
The combination of three continuity methods, three threshold-inclusion methods, two “other”-
aggregation methods and 10 threshold levels produces 180 possible variations per election period in 
each country. Figures 2a through 2c show the average results of each of these combinations applied 
to electoral data for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.   
 
4.1 Bivariate Results 
In analysing the results, we begin in reverse order because the effects of some variations vastly 
outweigh the effects of others (and the interaction among the variations becomes important).  
Continuity:  The method of addressing continuity has an extremely strong impact on the 
measurement of volatility.  With the threshold set at zero, over seven electoral periods in Slovakia 
18 
 
the strict linkage method produced an average volatility score of 47 whereas the relaxed linkage 
method averaged just over 31 points and the inclusive aggregation method averaged just under 20 
points.  The results were similar in the Czech Republic and Hungary, though at lower overall levels 
and with smaller overall differences. A look at calculations that comprise these results explains this 
difference: Strict linkage allows for the fewest connections across elections and therefore means 
that fewer parties have counterparts from t to t+1; relaxed linkage, by contrast, seeks out 
relationships between t and t+1 but still excludes linkage from all but one designated predecessor or 
successor.  The inclusive aggregation method nearly always produces lower volatility results 
because it adds together entities that would otherwise be separate, minimizing the differences 
between units across time periods.  Indeed, the inclusion method sometimes goes so far in this 
direction that it loses the capacity to make meaningful distinctions when parties split from one 
source and then merge with another. Figure 3 shows an example of split-merger combinations in 
which the inclusive aggregation cannot detect real change. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
When this “Z-effect” repeats across the party system, it significantly reduces the basis for 
calculating volatility.  In the example above, if Party D also lost a splinter, Party E, that merged 
with Party B and this process continued with Party F and beyond, the whole of the party system 
could be aggregated on each side of the calculation producing zero volatility even in the case of a 
wildly changing system.  This is more than just a theoretical possibility: in the case of Slovakia 
between 1992 and 1994, mergers and splits produced a single aggregate that stretched across the 
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political spectrum, including nine parties and accounting for over 50 per cent of all votes in both 
years (Kopeček, 2007; Author). 
Threshold Size: A change in the threshold can also produce a significant change in volatility, but its 
effect is only partially predictable and depends on other factors.  As Figures 2a-c show, volatility 
tends to decrease with an increasing threshold for both the relaxed linkage and strict linkage 
methods of continuity.  In the example of Slovakia, the addition of a 5 per cent threshold to the 
strict linkage method results in a 10-point drop in measured volatility. This finding fits expectations 
since in any party system with a significant number of small parties, a higher threshold forces the 
calculations to ignore changes among smaller parties and thus reveals apparently lower levels of 
volatility.  Thresholds do not produce this effect in the inclusive aggregation method.  The 
underlying party-level calculations show why: where small parties join with larger ones the 
elimination of small parent or offspring parties from one side of the equation because of thresholds 
actually decreases the measure’s ability to recognize continuity and may produce higher volatility 
scores rather than lower ones. 
 
Threshold inclusion: The method of applying the threshold matters as well. As Figures 2a-c show, 
the dotted line representing “blanket inclusion” usually produces a smaller drop in volatility than 
either the transition pairs or individual points methods since this method expands the number of 
parties included in the calculations and therefore mitigates the threshold’s overall effect. 
The individual point method creates a different sort of problem by simply zeroing out any figure 
below the threshold.  The effect has sometimes unpredictable effects, however, because the 
recalculation produces two countervailing effects: on one hand, it reduces the measured level of 
volatility by eliminating all pairs of party results that are both below the threshold (a party’s rise 
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from 1.0 per cent to 2.0 per cent represents a 1.0 contribution to volatility, but this is not included in 
volatility calculations when the threshold is set at 2.5 per cent and both points are set to zero); on 
the other hand it exacerbates volatility in cases where one result in an electoral period is above the 
threshold and the other is below (a party’s fall from 4.0 per cent to 1.0 per cent actually reflects a 
3.0 contribution to volatility score but the individual points method recalculates the second of the 
two figures to 0.0 per cent, producing an apparent contribution of 4.0, a “volatility subsidy” equal to 
the size of the smaller figure in the electoral period).  To understand these effects, Pedersen’s 
original index can be expanded to isolate particular sets of entities, some with values above the 
threshold in both time periods isa, some with values below the threshold in both time periods, isb, 
and some with values on either side of the threshold, isac and isbc.  This effect can be represented 
mathematically as 
                  Supra-threshold        Sub-Threshold        Cross-Threshold(down)    Cross-Threshold (up) 
𝑉 =
(∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑎,𝑡+1 − P𝑠𝑎,𝑡| + ∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑡+1 − P𝑖𝑠𝑏,𝑡| + ∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡+1 − P𝑠𝑏𝑐,𝑡| + ∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑐,𝑡+1 − P𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
∑ (P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The exclusion method sets all isb to zero, producing 
                 Supra-threshold        Sub-Threshold        Cross-Threshold(down)    Cross-Threshold (up) 
𝑉 =
(∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑎,𝑡+1 − P𝑠𝑎,𝑡|       +      ∑ |0 − 0|      +       ∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡+1 − 0|       +     ∑ |0 − P𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
∑ (P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
which can be simplified as 
                             Supra-threshold        Cross-Threshold(down)    Cross-Threshold (up) 
𝑉 =
(∑ |P𝑖𝑠𝑎,𝑡+1 − P𝑠𝑎,𝑡|         +         ∑ P𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡+1         +         ∑ P𝑠𝑎𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
∑ (P𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ P𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Raising the threshold has two effects.  On one hand, a higher threshold may decrease the number of 
parties whose volatility counts in the overall volatility calculation (because it is happening in the 
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excluded sub-threshold zone).  At the same time, a higher threshold may increase the number of 
cases in which the result at either t or t+1 is recalculated to zero, and thus may increase the net 
amount of cross-threshold volatility (up or down).  These two countervailing influences are only 
tangentially related (constrained by the overall party system) and depend heavily on the relative 
sizes and shifts of party support within a party system during a given time period.  Considerable 
change among sub-threshold parties will generate an artificially low score by increasing the relative 
importance of isb while activity that crosses the threshold will have the opposite effect. 
 
How these effects interact will depend on what actually happens in the political sphere.  The results 
of Figure 2a-c suggest that the cross-threshold effect tends to predominate in the countries studied 
here, causing increases in the threshold to increase the measured volatility.  The individual points 
method may thus inadvertently produce results that more closely resemble a threshold of zero, but 
this occurs only because of the artificial cross-threshold counter-effect that is largely accidental and 
cannot be relied upon to consistently push the volatility figure toward the level it would reach 
without a threshold.  It produces something close to the right answer but not necessarily for the right 
reason and therefore does not represent either a valid or reliable shortcut. 
 
The transitional pair method solves some of the problems above. It excludes data in only those 
instances where both characteristics in a pair of time periods are below the threshold but permits 
those where only one is below.  The advantage of this is to eliminate the cross-threshold distortions 
of the individual points method. In the example above, Party A’s fall from 4.0 per cent to 1.0 per 
cent is counted only as a 3.0 contribution to volatility while the subsequent rise from 1.0 per cent to 
2.0 per cent does not enter into the calculations at all. In practice this means a lower level of 
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volatility than if the cross-threshold effects were included, but since those effects are artificial and 
more erratic, it actually produces a smoother line - more directly proportional to the level of the 
threshold - and a more theoretically justifiable basis for calculation.  It is true that it requires slightly 
more effort in finding data for the time period before and after a party crossed the threshold, but this 
is more sustainable than gathering linkage information for a small party’s entire existence, and it is 
precisely the kind of information more likely to appear in the popular press (‘Party A rose to 4.0 per 
cent from its previous performance of 1.0 per cent’).   
 
Excluded data: Finally, there is the question of how to handle data that is not included by the 
threshold exclusion methods above (Ocaña, 2007). It is possible simply to omit the data from 
calculation (in effect recalculating it as zero), but some authors opt for an aggregation method and 
sum all excluded data into a single “other” category at the bottom of the data table.  This 
aggregation method raises questions about linkage between the aggregated “other” values from one 
time period to the next.  Since the aggregated “other” category may have different composition at 
each time point, and since, because each item aggregated into the “other” category may be (by 
definition) below the notice threshold of the scholar gathering the data, circumstances mean that 
there is no formal way to establish the degree of linkage between two successive “others.”  As with 
other questions above, there are several options with relatively clear effects on volatility: to create 
no linkage between the “other” results and calculate them as new, one-time parties (in effect adding 
the size of the “other” category to volatility), to refrain from including “other” at all, and to link the 
“other” results from one time-period to the next.  While theoretically possible, the first of these 
approaches is not a useful option because it assumes that smaller parties have no linkage with any 
other entity, past or future, thus magnifying volatility by the entire size of the other category.  The 
second of these, by contrast, presumes that there is no volatility among the unmeasured entities and 
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must produce a level that is equal to or lower than the actual volatility level.  The final method, 
which seems to offer a middle way, creates difficulties of another variety. The total size of the 
“other” from election point to election point is only distantly related to the “other” volatility. 
The difference in the size of the “other” category theoretically depends very little on differences 
related to the overall level of volatility or on the volatility that is lost to calculation through 
exclusion of data or cases.  The grey lines of Figure 1 shows that in practice in exclusion methods, 
linking data points in the “other” category restores about half the amount of volatility to the 
calculation that is removed through the imposition of thresholds, but the effect is not strictly linear 
and appears to increase disproportionately as the threshold approaches 5.0 per cent.  The volatility 
contributed to the overall result by the aggregated other categories, as with the subtractions in the 
recalculation method of the threshold, is an accidental effect.  If all parties under the threshold move 
in the same direction (they all get smaller or larger) then the “other” category is mathematically 
identical to the aggregation of the individual elements.  If, however, parties move in opposite 
directions, the volatility is masked and the “other” category obscures the actual pattern.  The “other” 
category may add volatility at the same time that is removed by the threshold but it does not 
necessarily put back the same volatility. In the cases used here it tends to follow the overall curve, 
but there is no mathematical basis for thinking that it will do so in a reliable fashion and no 
theoretical justification for aggregating the parties below the threshold into a single, continuous 
“other” (unlike the more solid basis for aggregating parties involved in mergers and splits in the 
aggregation alternative to linkage).   
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4.2 Multivariate results 
Looking at threshold, linkage and exclusion separately highlights how these individual ingredients 
can change the size and shape of the volatility, but what also matters is their relative effects and 
how they interact. To that end we subjected the data from the three countries to a multivariate 
regression (table 3). Given the continuous character of our dependent variable we use ordinary least 
squares with robust standards errors. In order to control for possible country- and election-effects, 
we use dummy variables for each election per country (not included in the results table for reasons 
of space).7 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
In the basic model, the continuity method has large and statistically significant impact (at .001 
level).  Shifting from the inclusive aggregation method to the relaxed linkage method increases 
volatility by nearly five points (4.8), and from there to the strict linkage increases volatility by 
another 10 points for a total of fifteen points above the inclusive aggregation method (15.2), 
controlling for the other independent variables.  Threshold size also has a significant impact: each 
one percentage point increase in the threshold reduces the amount of volatility by nearly one point 
(0.81).  Including an “other” category is also significant, though the effect of including such a 
category is relatively small, accounting for approximately a one point increase in volatility (1.3).  
The threshold inclusion method has no partial effect on the dependent variable, with no significance 
difference between methods that use individual points, the transitional-pairs, and blanket inclusion. 
 
                                               
7 The reference category for the dummies is the first Hungarian election. 
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Since Figures 2a-2c suggest that thresholds do not function the same way in all circumstances 
Model 2 uses interaction terms for threshold size and the other methods.  The choice of threshold 
inclusion method again has no effect, but all of the other methods do interact with the threshold size 
in statistically significant ways.  Model 3 removes the non-significant methods and interaction 
terms for cleaner results. We will therefore rely on Model 3, rather than Model 2, for the 
interpretation of the results.  The interaction effect between the continuity method and threshold 
size are substantially and statistically significant.  With the inclusive aggregation method, raising 
the threshold by one percentage point reduces volatility by only 0.5 points, but with the relaxed 
linkage method each one percentage point increase in the threshold produces a 1.3 unit drop in 
volatility and with the strict linkage method the result is a 1.4 unit drop, provided that the 
interaction with “other” is kept at 0. A similar, but less statistically significant (at .01 level) 
interaction effect occurs between threshold size and the aggregated method of dealing with “other” 
data.  Indeed, provided that the interaction with method is kept at 0, if other is at 0 the model 
predicts that, holding the other variables constant, each additional threshold point will produce a 
0.46 point decrease in volatility. On the other hand, the aggregated other method would produce 
only a 0.02 decrease. 
 
5. How to evaluate and improve volatility calculation methods 
The purpose of the calculations above is not merely to explain the diversity of volatility results 
found above and the relative impact of specific variations of Pedersen’s Index, but also to 
encourage more accurate and reliable measurement. In reverse order, moving from least to most 
important we offer three specific recommendations and a point for further consideration.  
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Firstly, since significantly different variations of the threshold inclusion method have no significant 
impact on volatility scores, the recommendation must rest on considerations other than results.  The 
blanket inclusion approach gives results closest to the desirable zero-threshold level, but it is both 
the most demanding in terms of data demands and the most problematic in terms of the constant 
need to recalculate volatility based on party performance in subsequent years.  The individual points 
method, by contrast, is the easiest to apply, but its underlying mathematics—zeroing out anything 
below the threshold—may not in every case produce the balance between eliminating one realm of 
volatility while introducing another that we see in these three cases.  The middle ground of the 
transitional pair approach splits the difference, capturing important cross-threshold changes without 
the need for massive additional data collection or fundamental recalculation back to the beginning 
of the dataset if a once-small party makes it big.       
 
Secondly, and with only slightly greater impact is the question of the right method for excluded 
data; while the decision has statistically significant consequences, it usually does not change 
volatility scores by more than a single point.  Since the use of an aggregated other category 
introduces as much noise as it removes (like the individual point method of threshold inclusion 
discussed above) and thereby introduces the possibility (albeit small) of more significant errors, it 
may be preferable simply to omit the category entirely and acknowledge that doing so will result in 
a small underestimate of volatility. 
 
Thirdly, and more significant is the question of the threshold itself.  The ideal threshold size is zero 
(especially since this eliminates the above problems connected to threshold inclusion and excluded 
data), but there is a clear trade-off between accuracy and the costs of gathering information. The 
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experience of data collection for this study suggests that efforts to lower the threshold are 
accompanied by an almost exponential increase in information costs.  For most larger parties the 
election data and continuity over time was easy to assemble, but as we pushed the threshold below 
1.0 per cent and especially below 0.5 per cent, we found parties that were impossible to trace 
without archival searches and interviews.  This difficulty may ease over time with the development 
of historical databases (especially if scholars gather information about small parties as each election 
happens), but with the current state of data for most countries, it is probably adequate to use a 1 per 
cent or 0.5 per cent threshold along with the acknowledgement that this may underestimate 
volatility by one to two percentage points in the case of the relaxed linkage and strict linkage 
methods and by a somewhat smaller amount with the inclusive aggregation method. 
 
Finally and most importantly there is the question of continuity method.  Unlike the other choices 
discussed above, this one offers no quick solution.  Each method actually represents a distinct and 
coherent way of thinking about the notion of change in party systems.    
 
The default assumption of the inclusive aggregation method is continuity: splits and mergers do not 
change voter preferences, and voters can navigate the institutional change to follow leaders or party 
factions they prefer, even if their favourites move out of an existing party and into a new splinter, or 
merge into a larger entity.  In this light, voters who chose to switch their votes from a small party 
into its merged successor (or from a big party to one of its splinters) may be engaging in an act of 
continuity rather than change. This method is therefore at its most useful revealing when continuity 
is absent. When scores produced by the inclusive aggregation method are high (by the standards of 
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past elections or neighbouring countries), it signals voter shifts so significant that they fall outside 
of existing institutional boundaries.   
 
By contrast, the default assumption of the relaxed linkage and strict linkage methods is change:  
splits and mergers can make it impossible for voters to stick with their past choices, and even 
choosing to follow a party absorbed by a merger or to follow favoured leaders who split off to form 
a party of their own represents a rupture with past choices.  This method is therefore at its most 
useful revealing when continuity is present.  When scores produced by the linkage methods are low, 
they signal that few voters are shifting despite any pressure imposed by splits and mergers. 
 
Neither method, then, is intrinsically better than another.  One option is to follow the path taken by 
Tóka and Henjak in measuring both raw (strict linkage) and adjusted (inclusive aggregation) scores 
to identify the upper and lower bounds of the possible values.  Taking this double calculation one 
step further produces a heretofore unnoticed advantage: a comparison of the results produced by 
both methods offers significant insight into the nature of volatility in particular countries and 
particular elections.  
 
The comparison in Figure 4 of inclusive aggregation and strict linkage volatility scores in the three 
countries used in this study accurately reflects the overall history of party change in the three 
countries.  All three alternate between higher and lower amounts of overall volatility among party 
units and these stand at the upper right and lower left corners of the diagonal line, but certain 
elections in certain countries also involve an amount of institutional volatility—splits and 
mergers—over and above the voter shift.  Shifts due to a split or merger were relatively rare in 
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Hungary and the Czech Republic and their data points tend to hug the diagonal (except for a slightly 
above-average shift related to the splintering and reformation of Hungary’s left in 2014 and a major 
shift following the breakup of the anti-Communist Civic Forum in the Czech Republic in 1992), 
Slovakia, by contrast, experienced three big merger- and split-related institutional shifts in 1992, 
1998 and 2002 which stand out sharply in a comparison of Slovakia’s its inclusive aggregation and 
strict linkage volatility scores. 
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
This multiple-method approach is admittedly less useful for those who need a single volatility score 
as a dependent or an independent variable in a multivariate regression model.  In such cases, 
scholars may need to make an explicit choice of method depending on whether the question at hand 
refers primarily to voter continuity or institutional change and acknowledge the potential impact of 
that choice on results.  It should also be possible at present to create distinct regression models for 
volatility based on results from the linkage and aggregation methods and then examine the degree to 
which the results agree or disagree.  In the longer run, however, the better option is to expand and 
improve volatility measurement so that the partial shifts related to mergers and splits are fully 
included in the formula and become an integrated part of overall volatility scores. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
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6. Conclusion 
Pedersen’s formula for calculating volatility has been widely used and for good reason. It offers a 
simple and straightforward way of capturing the extent of electoral change. But it also has its limits 
and its application can yield a wide variety of results depending on a series of secondary 
methodological assumptions about inclusion, aggregation and linkage that scholars use to address 
problems of limited party data and lack of clear party continuity. Even the recent significant 
advances offered in our understanding of volatility by Mainwaring and colleagues and Powell and 
Tucker are built on the foundations laid down by Pedersen. As Crabtree and Golder (2016a) assert 
the study of volatility is an area of research in need of new theoretical development, but satisfactory 
theorizing needs to be accompanied by the search for a robust measure. This need is all the more 
pressing given the apparent fluidity of party and electoral politics.   
 
Our analysis  does not suggest that Pedersen’s tool should necessarily be consigned to a (statistical) 
retirement home. Rather those employing his formula or using volatility statistics based on an 
application of his formula should be aware of the limitations and the explicit and implicit 
assumptions made in the calculations. Nonetheless, we do suggest that our analysis indicates 
potentially new and fruitful paths towards a more accurate measure of volatility. Space precludes a 
detailed examination, but three points deserve mention.  
 
Firstly,  party systems not just in Central Europe but in many parts of the globe across are 
increasingly marked not just by the emergence of new parties, but also of splits, splinters and 
mergers. Even just focusing on the cases in the region in the past few decades highlights the fact 
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that questions of linkage between parties at t and t+1 are not black and white, but shades of grey. 
Some parties can be categorized as ‘genuinely new’ (Sikk, 2005), but many more fall between the 
genuinely new and old. The solution here may be to introduce a more callibrated measure 
recognizing the degree of newness i.e. that party Y is 50% new and 50% of a continuity of party X. 
Take one example from Slovakia: the creation of the party Most-Hid in 2009. The party’s name, 
structure and programme were all new, but it was forged by a breakaway group from the Party of 
the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) including one of that party’s former leaders and most prominent 
figures, taking with them to the 2010 elections many of the voters who had cast preference votes for 
those individuals in previous elections. Some statistical recognition of partial continuity and change 
would intuitively seem more accurate. It is worth stressing that such a callibration could be done as 
part of a calculation using the Pedersen index, albeit in modified form. Producing a workable 
measure is unlikely to be easy, but by avoiding a dichotomous choice between successor and non-
successor, and moving toward a measurement of partial linkage among multiple entities would help 
better capture the degree and type of party vote share change.  
 
Secondly, in order to make a more robust calculation of linkage, scholars need to think more 
carefully  about what continuity and change are and how to measure them. It may be helpful to 
disaggregate parties into constituent components such as Katz and Mair’s (1993) three faces: party 
on the ground, the party in public office and the party central office when seeking to examine the 
transfer of “assets” (and liabilities) from party X at t to party Y at t +1. Indeed, the very language of 
assets and liabilities indicates that with empirical research it would be possible when a party like 
Most-Hid breaks away to derive a measure of continuity for SMK. Admittedly, it would be 
impossible to produce a fully satisfactory figure, but when the current binary choices are 0% or 
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100% continuity even an imperfect calibrated figure between those two extremes is likely to be 
more accurate.      
 
Thirdly, all this points to the need for more extensive and coordinated data collection and for any 
new models to be able to identify and accommodate the variations across space and time which 
close observers of party systems often observe (Mustillo and Jung, 2016). We also recognize that 
future research should also be directed at seeking to capture voter volatility through survey data. We 
are aware that such data cannot be retrospectively conjured up and that aggregate-level calculations 
will continue to be important as well, and we believe that methods of measurement which assess 
mergers, splits and splinters in party systems can also serve as a new basis for understanding 
parties’ institutional change. 
 
Data collection is time-consuming and expensive and even the most extensive data collection will 
not yield perfect results. Nonetheless, there are many country experts whose expertise and 
knowledge of the development of party politics in their cases could be pooled and coordinated to 
yield rich mines of information. Otherwise continued attempts to generate large n volatility scores 
on the basis of sketchy and inconsistent data – and analyses exploring other political phenomenon 
using these volatility calculations - will simply continue to produce edifices built on unstable 
foundations.   
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Figure 1 Averages of pair-wise differences in election-period volatility results according to author. 
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Figure 2a. Volatility in the Czech Republic, 1990-2013
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Figure 2b. Volatility in Hungary, 1990-2014
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Figure 2c. Volatility in Slovakia, 1990-2012 
 
 
Figure 3 The Inclusive aggregation method’s “Z-effect”  
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Figure 4 Volatility scores for Inclusive aggregation and Strict linkage methods in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, 1990-2014. 
 
 
Table 1 Electoral volatility in 10 EU post-communist democracies (1990-2013) 
Country Author(s)8 Electoral volatility during election 
period 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Bielasiak 17.5 22.8 - - - 
Birch 10.0 22.0 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 17.8 25.7 50.5 35.3 49.8 
Lane 21.1 23.1 47.9 - - 
Powell & Tucker 21.7 39.3 57.2 41.2 54.5 
Sikk 19.1 24.6 - - - 
 Bågenholm 24.2 14.4 8.6 17.9 33.7 
                                               
8 Bågenholm 2009; Bakke and Sitter 2005; Bielasiak 2002 and 2005; Birch 2003; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2011; 
Gwiazda 2015; Lane and Ersson 2007; Mainwaring et al. 2016; Markowski 2016; Meleshevich 2007; Powell and 
Tucker 2014; Sikk 2005; Tóka and Henjak 2007 (original data files and answers to process questions provided in 
personal follow-up conversation). 
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Czech 
Republic 
Bakke & Sitter 24.2 16.3 13 - - 
Bielasiak 18.5 7.4 - - - 
Birch 16.1 7.6 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 24.2 17.2 11.5 17.1 36.6 
Lane 27.0 9.3 16.3 - - 
Mainwaring et al 31.4 18.5 15.7 - - 
Powell & Tucker 38.5 16.7 19.4 17.3 - 
Sikk 27.0 15.8 - - - 
Tóka & Henjak (Raw) 31.4 18.6 30.9 28.5 - 
Tóka & Henjak 
(Adjusted) 
29.2 16.4 16.6 20.9 - 
 
 
 
 
Estonia 
Bågenholm 39.6 22.1 34.1 22.1 - 
Bielasiak 28.4 23.4 42.4 - - 
Birch 13.2 12.1 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 45.4 27.8 26.6 23.1 13 
Lane 27.9 33.5 35 - - 
Mainwaring et al 55.6 42 36.4 - - 
Meleshevich 68.0 49 35.7 - - 
Powell & Tucker 62.9 44.4 40.8 39.7 - 
Sikk 21.3 24.1 - - - 
 
 
 
 
Hungarya 
Bågenholm 22.3 30.4 19.7 4 32.8 
Bakke & Sitter 26.8 31.6 19.1 - - 
Bielasiak 26.4 28.5 22.5 - - 
Birch 23.9 29.4 19.1 - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 44.5 31.6 21.8 8 32 
Lane 26.1 31.4 18.1 - - 
Mainwaring et al 28.9 33.7 25.1 - - 
Powell & Tucker 40.9 26.2 28.3 10.4 - 
Sikk 23.7 32.7 - - - 
Tóka & Henjak (Raw) 28.3 33.6 54.3 49.5 - 
Tóka & Henjak 
(Adjusted) 
25.8 31.7 18.3 8.4 - 
 Bågenholm 39.8 43.7 44.8 27.3 - 
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Latvia 
Bielasiak 33.5 24.5 51.2 - - 
Birch 25.7 23.0 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 42.1 58.1 49.6 26.3 29.4 
Lane 37.9 45 46.1 - - 
Mainwaring et al 47.2 56.6 52.1 - - 
Meleshevich 55.1 59.3 72.6 - - 
Powell & Tucker 54.8 58.3 62.3 26.6 - 
Sikk 36.6 45.2 - - - 
 
 
 
 
Lithuaniaa 
 
Bågenholm 30.4 39.9 50 31.6 - 
Bielasiak 28.9 49.6 - - - 
Birch 20.4 36.7 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 35.8 48.8 50.8 33.4 - 
Lane 37.4 48.3 50 - - 
Meleshevich 64.0 74.1 - - - 
Powell & Tucker 73.1 71.8 85.1 47.0 - 
Sikk 35.9 48.5 - - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
Bågenholm 24.4 15.5 36.2 34.1 24.4 
Bakke & Sitter 34.3 21.3 51.1 - - 
Bielasiak 26.8 22.3 43 - - 
Birch 17.9 12.3 30.0 - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 34.4 31 51.3 37.9 24.4 
Gwiazda 28.5 16.2 44.8 31.6 21.5 
Lane 19.4 23.6 34.3 - - 
Mainwaring et al 35.4 51.5 56.5 38.7 - 
Markowski 34.8 19.2 49.3 38.4 25 
Powell & Tucker 41.6 64.8 54.4 35.3 34.1 
Sikk 31.7 21.1 - - - 
Tóka & Henjak (Raw) 47.4 67.0 83.5 52.4 - 
Tóka & Henjak 
(Adjusted) 
34.5 19.5 51.6 41.1 - 
 
 
Bågenholm 14.4 30.3 19.9 19.7 - 
Bielasiak 12.4 21 - - - 
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Romania 
Birch 14.0 16.6 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 15.8 30.5 20.8 21.5 - 
Lane 16.8 34.7 12.1 - - 
Mainwaring et al 29.1 47.6 36.1 - - 
Powell & Tucker 49.2 52.6 30.9 49.6 - 
Sikk 14.3 29.1 - - - 
 
 
 
 
Slovakia 
Bågenholm 20.5 22.1 32.9 20.8 26.1 
Bakke & Sitter 20.6 20.3 30.3 - - 
Bielasiak 13.3 20.1 - - - 
Birch 12.8 9.4 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 31.1 33.7 60.9 24.6 38.5 
Lane 13.7 21.5 28.6 - - 
Powell & Tucker 45.0 61.0 68.9 39.6 - 
Sikk 13.6 20.2 - - - 
Tóka & Henjak (Raw) 43.9 53.9 63.1 33.0 - 
Tóka & Henjak 
(Adjusted) 
23.7 21.4 29.9 32.9 - 
 
 
 
Slovenia 
Bågenholm 22.0 27.5 23.3 35 - 
Bielasiak 25.4 22.1 - - - 
Birch - 17 - - - 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 31.3 27.4 21.4 33.5 - 
Lane 24.4 18.7 22.2 - - 
Powell & Tucker 39.9 34.4 52.2 41.3 - 
Sikk 23.8 18.8 - - - 
Tóka & Henjak (Raw) 39.4 19.7 31.3 - - 
aAlthough it is not always clear from the published sources, our conversations with authors indicate that all 
of these measures refer to the proportional representation segments within these mixed systems. 
Table 2. Volatility calculation Values for hypothetical Party A according to various threshold 
inclusion methods. 
Threshold 
inclusion 
method 
Threshold 
example 
Data category Election 
1 
Election 
2 
Election 
3 
Election 
4 
Average 
contribution 
to volatility 
No 
threshold 
0% Actual Value 2% 7% 1% 4%  
Change  +5 -6 +3  4.7 
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Individual 
points 
3% Adjusted value 0%* 7% 0%* 4%  
Change  +7 -7 +4  6.0 
5% Adjusted value 0%* 7% 0%* 0%*  
Change  +7 -7 0  4.7 
Transition 
pairs 
3% Adjusted value 2% 7% 1% 4%  
Change  +5 -6 +3  4.7 
5% Adjusted value 2% 7% 1% 0%*  
Change  +5 +6 -1  4.0 
Blanket 
inclusion 
3% Adjusted value 2% 7% 1% 4%  
Change  +5 -6 +3  4.7 
5% Adjusted value 2% 7% 1% 4%  
Change   +5 -6 +3   4.7 
Maximum 
difference 
between 
methods 
3% Value 2% 0% 1% 1%  
Change 
 
 2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
  
5% Min. Value 2% 0% 1% 4%  
Change   2 1 4    
*Value recalculated from actual election value due to threshold inclusion method. 
 
Table 3 (previously table 4. Re-numbered as table 3 moved to the appendix): The relative 
importance of linkage, threshold and exclusion 
Model Model 1 Model 2 
Description Basic Model Basic 
+Interactions 
Number of observations 3,960 3,960 
R-squared 0.673 0.676 
Root MSE 0.082 0.082 
Constant  0.200*** 0.188*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Continuity method 
(baseline = Inclusive 
aggregation) 
Relaxed 
linkage 
 0.048*** 0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Strict 
linkage 
 0.152*** 0.174*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Threshold size  -0.809*** -0.358 
 (0.082) (0.197) 
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Threshold inclusion method 
(baseline = Individual 
points) 
Transitional 
pairs 
 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Blanket 
inclusion 
 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Excluded data method Aggregated 
linked other 
 0.013*** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Interaction: Threshold size 
with Continuity method 
(baseline = aggregation) 
Relaxed 
linkage 
 - -0.821*** 
 - (0.160) 
Strict 
linkage 
 - -0.901*** 
 - (0.228) 
Interaction: Threshold size 
with Threshold inclusion 
method (baseline = 
Individual points) 
Transitional 
pairs 
 - -0.200 
 - (0.201) 
Blanket 
inclusion 
 - -0.098 
 - (0.202) 
Interaction: Threshold size 
with Excluded data method 
Aggregated 
linked other 
 - 0.435** 
 - (0.164) 
Note: OLS with Robust Standard Errors (in brackets). ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 4. Overall summary of volatility related options and recommendations  
Problem Question Method What the Method Does Effect of Method Recommendation 
Dealing 
with 
change 
How to treat 
continuity 
over time 
when parties 
change? 
Inclusive 
aggregation 
Measures continuity between a 
party and the sum of all 
successors or predecessors and 
ignore name changes 
Produces low volatilty magnitude 
because it avoids major institutional 
shifts in parties. 
Authors should understand and specify the 
logic and impact of the method they choose.  
Each method reflects a distinct understanding of 
the meaning of change and none is inherently 
preferable, but the choice of method has a major 
impact on outcomes and must be specified and 
justified to prevent confusion.  Comparing the 
results of more than one method may enrich 
discussion by helping to identify problem areas.  
Further research is needed on non-binary 
approaches that reflect partial continuity. 
Relaxed 
linkage 
Accepts continuity between a 
party and the successor or 
predecessor with the largest vote 
share regardless of name change 
Produces higher volatility 
magnitude than inclusive 
aggregation because it is affected to 
some degree by institutional shifts 
Strict 
linkage 
Accepts continuity only for 
parties of the same name and 
organizational continuity.   
Produces the highest volatility 
magnitude because it is extremely 
sensitive to institutional shifts.   
Dealing 
with size 
Where to set 
the threshold 
for excluding 
very small 
data points? 
Threshold 
Level 
Excludes data points below a 
chosen level which can be set at 
any point from zero up 
Produces lower volatility 
magnitude at higher thresholds 
because they ignore movement 
below the threshold. 
Lower thresholds are better than larger ones 
because they are less likely to underestimate 
volatility, but very low thresholds impose very 
high data-gathering costs for small parties.  A 
threshold of 0.5% or 1.0% keeps data-gathering 
costs reasonable without much loss of accuracy. 
How to deal 
with data 
points below 
the threshold 
for parties 
that 
sometimes 
rise above the 
threshold? 
Only 
Individual 
points 
Includes only data points above 
threshold and sets all others to 
zero 
Minimizes data costs by looking 
only above the threshold, and needs 
no retro-active calculation but 
artificially introduces volatility.   
Transition pair and Blanket inclusion methods 
are both reasonable choices because they avoid 
the tendency of the Individual points method to 
artificially introduce volatility.  Between the two, 
the Transition Pair method has lower data-
gathering costs but a slightly higher chance of 
introducing small amounts of volatility, while the 
Blanket inclusion method comes closest to a zero-
threshold model with its higher data-gathering 
costs.  Both may require some retro-active 
recalculation with the addition of new data. 
Transition 
Pairs 
Includes all data points above the 
threshold and all data points 
immediately preceding and 
following those in time. 
Keeps data costs relatively low by 
avoiding the most obscure periods 
of small parties, but may lead to 
counterintuitive results in rare cases. 
Blanket 
Inclusion 
Includes all data points for a 
party if that party exceeds the 
threshold even once 
Maximizes data cost, especially if 
threshold is very low, but produces 
results closest to zero threshold 
What to do 
with data 
points that do 
not meet 
threshold 
requirements? 
Aggregation Aggregates all vote shares 
excluded by the threshold into a 
single "other" and treat it as a 
party in its own right 
Acknowledges all available data, 
but does not serve as a reliable 
indicator unless all changes point 
in the same direction. 
Exclusion method is more reliable though it may 
produce a slight under-estimate of volatility. The 
Aggregation method is not as reliable because its 
unified "other" treats multiple independent parties 
as a single unit and its composition varies in 
unspecified ways over time. Exclusion Removes from subsequent 
calculation all vote shares 
excluded by the threshold 
Avoids unreliable results by 
ignoring data below the threshold. 
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Table A for Appendix (an amended version of Table 3 in the original submission). Method choices of authors in Pedersen Index 
calculations: move to appendix  
Author Dealing with size Dealing with change 
Inclusion standards and method  Continuity method 
Threshold for 
inclusion? 
Threshold 
inclusion method 
Excluded data 
method 
How to determine 
successor in case of 
party split 
How to determine 
predecessor in case 
of party merger 
Categorization 
Bågenholm Election threshold Individual points Aggregated and 
linked other 
Party of same name; if 
not, no successor 
Sum of predecessors Mixed method  
(Inclusive aggregation for 
predecessor, Relaxed 
linkage for successor) 
Bakke 2% Transitional pairs Aggregated and 
linked other 
Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
Bielsiak No - Aggregated and 
linked other 
Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
Birch No - Aggregated and 
linked other 
Party of same name; if 
not, no successor 
Party of same name; 
if not, merger is new 
Strict linkage 
Dassonenville 
& Hooghe 
1% Individual points Aggregated and 
linked other 
Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
Gwiazdka No - None Largest offspring party Sum of predecessors Mixed method  
(Inclusive aggregation for 
predecessor, Relaxed 
linkage for successor) 
Lane & 
Ersson 
No - Aggregated and 
linked other 
Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive Aggregation 
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Mainwaring, 
España & 
Gervasoni 
No 
 
- None Party of same name; if 
not, largest offspring  
Party of same name; 
if not, largest parent*  
Relaxed linkage 
Markowski No 
 
- None Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
Meleshevich No 
  
- None Author chooses 
successor 
Author chooses 
predecessor  
Mixed linkage (Relaxed 
linkage and Strict linkage) 
Powell & 
Tucker 
2% 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Individual points Uncalculated Party of same name; if 
not, no successor 
All mergers new 
unless under 5% 
Strict linkage 
Sikk - Aggregated and 
linked other 
Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
Tóka (raw) - None Party of same name; if 
not, largest offspring 
Party of same name; 
if not, largest parent 
Relaxed linkage 
Tóka 
(adjusted) 
- None Sum of successors Sum of predecessors Inclusive aggregation 
*All authors use an inclusive aggregation approach for electoral coalitions except for Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni, who in this case adopt a 
relaxed linkage approach by using the largest predecessor party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
